Abstract-In this paper, we study the inter-linked problems of wireless service provider (WSP) selection of users and bandwidth allocation of WSPs in multi-tier heterogeneous cellular networks employing the approach combining stochastic geometry and game theory. In particular, the expected average user achievable rate is calculated by modeling the distributions of users and base stations (BSs) as independent homogeneous Poisson point processes. Moreover, a hierarchical game framework is presented to model the complicated interactions among users and WSPs. Wherein, the evolutionary game, non-cooperative game, and multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game models are, respectively, adopted to formulate the competition among users, competition among WSPs, and cyclic dependence between users and WSPs. According to backward induction, the formulated Stackelberg game would be solved after the formulated evolutionary game and non-cooperative game are sequentially studied. For the evolutionary game, both the closed-form expression and the asymptotically stability of its evolutionary equilibrium (EE) were analyzed. Then, conditioned on the obtained EE, the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE) for the non-cooperative bandwidth allocation game is established; furthermore, a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the NE is derived. Finally, extensive simulation results verify both the validity of our analysis and the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation D EPLOYING heterogeneous cellular networks (HCNs) has been regarded as one of promising approaches to cater for the increased demand of high-data-rate services and requirement of ubiquitous access. Augmenting an existing macro-cell by deploying small coverage cellular networks with high density can potentially dramatically increase the network capacity without incurring high cost [2] - [5] . In this light, there would be a novel network structure for future wireless communications, which is termed as the multi-tier HCN and may consist of high power macrocell BSs (MBSs) as well as various classes of low power nodes, e.g., microcell BSs, picocell BSs (PBS), femtocell BSs (FBSs), and possibly future radiating elements [6] .
When deploying HCNs, it is essential to analyze the systemlevel performance and investigate the effects of different system parameters to obtain useful design insights. Hence, analytically tractable models would be of great interest and be of importance. In contrast to the hexagonal grid model widely applied to evaluate traditionally well-planned single-tier cellular networks, an alternate stochastic geometry based approach was recently proposed, with which the transmitting nodes (e.g., BSs) are modeled as randomly located points through a Poisson point process (PPP) [6] . Compared to the femto-cells which may be randomly deployed, it seems somewhat counterintuitive to model macro cellular networks as a PPP. However, the accuracy of this tractable model has been verified through empirical validation in recent work like [7] . To this end, under this tractable, yet reasonable assumption that different tiers of BSs are distributed according to independent PPPs, the performance of HCNs can be efficiently studied.
Conditioned on such efficient analysis methods for HCNs, some specific deployment strategies can be developed to provide users better experience and bring wireless service providers (WSPs) higher revenues. In this work, we focus on the scenario consisting of multiple HCNs deployed by several WSPs, which serve multiple populations of users. Wherein, WSPs determine the bandwidth allocation strategies for their own individual deployed HCNs, while each user decides which WSP to subscribe to get service. Here, the complicated strategic interactions among users, among WSPs, and among users and WSPs make the problem interesting and difficult to solve. Due to the fact that each user and WSP are independent and self-interested decision makers, we choose to employ the approach combining stochastic geometry and game theory to study this complicated problem.
B. Related Work
In order to avoid severe cross-tier interference in HCNs, the dedicated-channel deployment can be adopted, with which orthogonal bandwidth resources will be allocated to different tiers. Though this deployment is sub-optimal in terms of spectral efficiency, it is a relatively simple approach that can be conveniently implemented in practice [8] , [9] . In this case, how to properly split the precious and scarce spectrum 1 into subbands and allocate them to different tiers is one fundamental and important issue directly facing WSPs [1] , [8] , [9] . On top of the stochastic geometry based performance analyses for HCNs (e.g., on coverage probability, throughput and energy efficiency [11] - [14] ), some efficient spectrum resource allocation schemes have been proposed [15] - [18] . Specifically, in [15] and [16] a two-tier heterogeneous network was considered where the disjoint spectrum resources were allocated to different tiers to eliminate crosstier interference and its optimal spectrum allocation strategy was investigated. Authors in [17] focused on the HCN consisting of macrocells and femtocells and studied the optimal spectrum allocation strategies for both the open and closed access modes. Although only the specific case of two-tier was studied, some analysis results obtained in [17] can also be extended to more general cases, i.e., multi-tier HCNs. The spectrum partition and user association were jointly studied for multi-tier HCNs in [18] , where a cell range expansion scheme was adopted for load balancing. Besides these researches, the service selection as well as bandwidth allocation for the two-tier femtocell network has also been studied from the economic perspective in [19] .
In all the above mentioned works [15] - [19] , they have one common point that all of them have considered the case where there only exists one WSP deploying the whole networks, i.e., a monopoly. However, in practice there are generally multiple WSPs coexisting, each of which has his own HCN and needs to compete with other WSPs to attract more users for higher revenue. For instance, Sprint, Verizon as well as AT&T are coexisting in the US. As a mathematical tool for analyzing the conflict and cooperation among autonomous agents, game theory [20] has been widely adopted to formulate and study the interactions among service providers [21] - [27] . Wherein, some of them have also focused on the HCN based scenarios [25] - [27] . Nevertheless, the major differences between these studies and ours are two folds: (i ) the type of HCNs considered in [25] - [27] is very different to those studied in previous researches [11] , [12] , [14] - [18] and ours. Specifically, in [25] - [27] different tiers have been deployed by different WSPs and each WSP only provides one service to users. Hence, their main concerns are spectrum leasing among different WSPs. Our work however jointly studies the WSP selection of users and spectrum allocation of WSPs.
(ii) Besides game theory, the tools from stochastic geometry have also been applied in our work to study the behavior of users as well as WSPs. Compared with the pure game theory based methodology focusing on the deterministic model [25] - [27] , the analysis combining game theory and stochastic geometry would provide more design insights to system designers and WSPs. This interesting and novel methodology has also been applied by recent work [23] (and its journal version [28] ) and [29] , with which the distributed power control and sub-channel selection have been investigated, respectively. We note that, in [23] and [28] only the strategic interaction among different WSPs was studied, while the rationality of users and their association behaviors were ignored. Nevertheless, in our work, two levels of competition and one cyclic dependency have been considered to well address the inter-linked problems of WSP selection of users and bandwidth allocation of WSPs.
C. Contributions
With an efficient bandwidth allocation strategy, individual WSP can provide better quality of service, attract more subscribers (i.e., gain a larger market share) and finally achieve higher revenue. We study the scenario consisting of multiple HCNs deployed by different WSPs and offering multiple services, each of which is favored by a certain population of users. We consider this scenario because, on one hand, competition among multiple WSPs is common in many countries. On the other hand, the number of users in the market is large and may change, and from a system-level perspective, it is more sensible to study them statistically. Furthermore, while a stationary user will prefer to connect to a femtocell nearby, a highly mobile user would connect to a macrocell in order to avoid frequent handovers. Thus, on average the total population of users can be divided into parts, each of which prefers a specific tier of HCNs; each user can select the best WSP for any tier. Besides that, to attract more users and further obtain higher revenue, each WSP needs to decide how to allocate the available spectrum resource to different tiers by fully considering both the behavior of users and other WSPs. Based on the above analyses, there are two levels of competitions and a cyclic dependency needing to be explicitly addressed, i.e., the competition among users, the competition among WSPs, and the dependency between the behaviors of users and WSPs. This makes the spectrum resource partition problem nontrivial.
The main contributions of this work can be summarized as follows.
1) We systematically analyze the average achievable rate that can be provided by WSPs adopting the stochastic geometry approach. Moreover, we present a hierarchical game framework to investigate the interactions in the multi-tier HCNs. Particularly, in the lower level of the framework we formulate the WSP selection of users as an evolutionary game [30] and meanwhile, in the upper level we model the competition among different WSPs as a Non-cooperative Bandwidth Allocation Game (N-BAG). Additionally, the cyclic dependency between the users and WSPs is studied by applying the multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game theory. With the proposed framework, individual WSPs can capture the equilibrium of users and further develop informed bandwidth allocation strategies for their own HCNs. 2) For the formulated evolutionary WSP selection game, we consider the evolutionary equilibrium (EE) as its solution and meanwhile, have investigated the uniqueness and derived the close form expression of the interior EE. Furthermore, we prove that the interior EE is also an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) which is asymptotically stable, i.e., when ESS is achieved in the population, a small amount of invaders adopting other strategies instead of the ESS can be finally eliminated. This intuitively means that, statistically speaking, it seems plausible for each WSP to evaluate its own market share and determine the HCN deployment strategy based on this equilibrium. 3) We have established the existence and derived the uniqueness condition of Nash equilibrium (NE) for N-BAG and meanwhile, developed an offline algorithm to achieve this equilibrium state. Simulation results show that, compared with the solution brought by other approaches, when the self-interested and rational WSPs allocate their own spectrum resources by adopting our proposed strategy, a higher sum revenue could be achieved. The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section II, the description of system model and formulation of the hierarchical game framework are given. Subsequently, Section III presents the evolutionary WSP selection game and studies its solutions. In Section IV, we present the N-BAG, analyze the existence and derive the uniqueness condition of its NE, and develop an algorithm to obtain the NE. Then, extensive numerical simulation results are presented and analyzed in Section V and finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND HIERARCHICAL GAME FRAMEWORK
In this work, we consider an area of interest where totally K different services are provided to users (e.g., the macrocell service, picocell service and femtocell service, etc.) by N WSPs having deployed their own individual HCNs. Additionally, for each HCN n, there are K n tiers, each of which has the BSs of a particular class, such as MBSs or PBSs. Note that the BSs in different tiers may differ from each other due to differences in the transmit power, coverage area and spatial density [11] - [13] . An illustration of a 3-tier HCN is presented in Fig. 1 , where three classes of BSs are deployed. As shown in this figure, the MBS has the largest coverage (i.e., highest transmit power) but the lowest density.
A. Network Deployment Model
For notational simplicity, we denote the set of WSPs as N = {1, 2, · · · , N} and meanwhile, for each HCN n, the set of its K n tiers of networks as K n . Without loss of generality, we consider that K n ⊆ K = {1, 2, · · · , K }, which means different WSPs may provide different services to users. For instance, some WSPs may provide macrocell service, picocell service and femtocell service, but some WSPs may only provide macrocell service. For each HCN n, we assume that the BSs in the k-th (∀k ∈ K n ) tier are spatially distributed as a two dimensional independent homogeneous Poisson Point Process (PPP) n,k of density λ n,k and transmit at power P n,k . Moreover, we consider that the potential users of each service k ∈ K are located according to a homogeneous PPP u k with intensity λ u k [15] - [17] . The above assumption indicates that each service is associated to a certain user density. This is explained by the preferences of different kinds of users to different services. Of course in practice, one user can churn from one population set to another, but on an average the population of each user type can be assumed to be stable.
HCNs are operating on the orthogonal spectrum and meanwhile, each WSP n has to properly allocate the available spectrum bandwidth B n to different tiers, i.e., the WSP deployment framework is adopted [9] , [19] . For the HCN operated by WSP n, we denote the spectrum bandwidth allocated to tier k by B n,k and the spectrum allocation profile by B n = B n,1 , B n,2 , · · · , B n,K n . Then, there is only co-tier interference but no cross-tier interference in each HCN. Here, the downlink transmission is considered and we assume that, in the k-th tier deployed by WSP n, the signal from each BS to each user experiences path loss with the path loss exponent α n,k > 2, Rayleigh fading with average power of unity, and lognormal shadow fading with mean μ n,k and standard deviation σ n,k in dB.
When providing services to users, let us denote the price charged by WSP n for service k as C n,k which is a fixed access fee having units $ per unit of time. We note that pricing for services should consider the combination of many complex factors in practice, e.g., the operation investment of WSPs, the management made by the government, the real consumption level of the concerning country, etc. For ease of exposition, we will set the prices as fixed and focus on the interaction between service selection and resource allocation in the following. Each user can independently decide to get service from any WSP they prefer. Following previous studies [21] , [22] , [24] , [26] , we assume, for simplicity, that each user could churn from one provider to another incurring no additional cost. 2 After subscribing to one WSP, each user will associate with the BS bringing him the maximum received power [7] , [12] . We note that the WSP selection of each user is simultaneously determined by the data rate offered and prices charged by WSPs, which would finally result in a population share of x n,k for each WSP n and service k, i.e., x n,k ≥ 0, 
B. Hierarchical Game Framework
Here, we consider that both users and WSPs are selfinterested, i.e., individual users want to maximize their own payoff through selecting the appropriate WSP and meanwhile, each WSP wants to attract more users and further improve his own revenue by properly utilizing spectrum resources. In specific, after selecting the service provided by a particular WSP, each user can obtain some payoff determined by both the service price and expected transmission rate. Intuitively, the expected rate of each user will be affected by both the number of users choosing the same network (i.e., other users' actions) and the available spectrum bandwidth allocated to this network (i.e., WSPs' actions). On the other hand, to attract more users, each WSP also needs to make his own decision on the spectrum partition by fully considering the behaviors of users and other WSPs. The scenario under investigation therefore allows two levels of competition and meanwhile one cyclic dependency as described above. 3 It worth noting that, based on the conduction of above mentioned interactions, there also exist indirect (potential) effects among the behavior of users belonging to different populations. To be specific, the WSP selection behavior of users preferring one service will not affect those of users in other types, while it brings influence to WSPs joining in N-BAG. This can further affect the bandwidth allocation results of WSPs, which, in return, can change the WSP selection behavior of users in all populations.
The competitions and cyclic dependency can be illustrated utilizing the hierarchical framework shown in Fig. 2 , where three different game formulations are adopted to investigate the inter-linked problems. Specifically, in the lower level we formulate the WSP selection of users as an evolutionary game, with which the long-term equilibrium behavior of users can be captured. Meanwhile, in the upper level we have formulated a non-cooperative game to depict the competition among WSPs. In addition, the cyclic dependency interaction between the users and WSPs is modeled by applying the multi-leader multifollower Stackelberg game theory, where WSPs are leaders and populations of users are followers.
We note that the formulated Stackelberg game can be solved with backward induction, i.e., the leaders (WSPs) can make their own responses (i.e., B * ) by fully considering the followers' (users') equilibrium reactions (i.e., x * (B * )) [20] , [22] , [25] . Here, the mapping x * (B * ) denotes the equilibrium behavior of users when given the WSPs' strategy profile B * . Additionally,
represents the state of the k-th population. In this light, for each WSP n, the key problem becomes how to accurately estimate the equilibrium behavior of users and thus make an informed decision. In other words, the formulated Stackelberg game can be solved after the formulated evolutionary game and N-BAG have been sequentially studied. In the following, the evolutionary game modeling the user reaction to the WSP bandwidth allocation is studied first in Section III. Then, the competition among WSPs for higher revenue through bandwidth allocation based on stabilized user population shares will be investigated in Section IV.
III. WSP SELECTION EVOLUTIONARY GAME When given the bandwidth allocation profiles of WSPs
and B n,k > 0, ∀n ∈ N , the expected transmission rate of each user is determined by which WSP he get service from and how many users selecting the same WSP as him. In this section, we formulate the users' WSP selection behavior as an evolutionary game which is initially used in biology to study the evolution of animal populations, and then later applied in economics to model human behavior [30] . Recently, this mathematical tool has also been adopted to study engineering problems in wireless communications, e.g., multiple access control and power control [32] , routing [33] , spectrum sensing and access [34] , [35] , network selection [36] , etc. We note that [36] is one of the seminal researches utilizing evolutionary game to study the network selection of users in a HetNet, where the competition among users has been investigated. However, completed analysis of the interaction among different networks and the cyclic dependency between users and networks were absent in [36] . The main advantage of this tool is that it can be efficient applied to study the dynamics of a large amount of users active for a long duration. Meanwhile, in contrast to traditional game models [20] , [25] , [37] , there is no requirement that each player in the game is fully rational or has complete knowledge of the other players. This is the primary motivation for levering evolutionary game formulation to study the equilibrium of users in this context. Next, we will analyze the expected average rate of each user adopting the stochastic geometry based approach and then, present the formulation of the WSP selection game as well as the investigation of solutions for this game. 4 
A. Expected Average User Rate
Since different HCNs and tiers operate on orthogonal spectrum bands, we can equally consider the N multi-tier HCNs as n∈N K n different single-tier cellular networks when analyzing the quality of provided services. For notational simplicity, we denote these equivalent one-tier cellular networks by set
where the network with index s = (n, k) ∈ S represents the k-th tier of cells deployed by WSP n. In this subsection, we briefly call one tier of a HCN as one network. In each network s, ∀s ∈ S, the expected achievable rate offered by each cell,R s , can be derived by considering a typical user and using the stochastic geometry based approach. According to Slivnyak's theorem [38] , the typical user can be arbitrarily chosen. Therefore, we consider the typical user located at the origin without loss of generality and furthermore, denote the BS associated to this user as y 0 s . Then, the received power of the typical user from y 0 s can be expressed as
where D y 0 s represents the distance from the typical user to the concerned BS y 0 s . In addition, h 0 s and ψ 0 s represent the effect of Rayleigh fading and that of shadow fading, respectively. Modeling the channel with shadow fading makes that the received power is not exponentially distributed which make the performance analysis challenging [38] . To address this, we first refer to the displacement theorem and introduce the following lemma, which indicates that the long-term shadowing effects can be interpreted as a random displacement of BSs placed according to the original PPP [39] , [40] .
Lemma 1:
αs y s , ∀y s ∈ s , which is also a homogeneous PPP with the density as follows
Wherein, μ s and σ s are respectively the mean and standard deviation of the shadow fading in network s.
Based on Lemma 1 we would hereafter consider the equivalent point process (e) s instead of the original one s , when analyzing the expected achievable rateR s in network s.
Meanwhile, the association based on the maximum received power is then equal to that based on the minimum distance (for (e) s ), i.e., each user will communicate with the closest BS in each networks s. For the new point process, let z 0 s ∈ (e) s denote the BS associated to the typical user located at the origin. Then the SINR at this user can be expressed as
where (e) s z 0 s denotes the set of BSs causing interference to the typical user, and I s denotes the cumulative interference. Furthermore, the expected achievable rateR s is
where
and additionally, the expectation is taken over both the spatial PPP and fading distribution. Since for a positive random variable X the expectation can be calculated as (e x − 1)) as follows
We note that the probability density function (PDF) of the distance D z 0 k , the distribution of h 0 s and the expression of I s are all used in the derivational processes of Eq. (6) and (7). Here, for the sake of conciseness, we have omitted the detailed derivations and refer readers to [6] and [41] for similar processes.
Finally, combining Eq. (6) and (7), we can derive the expression of the expected achievable rate in each cell of networks s, i.e.,R s , given the spectrum allocation profiles of WSPs B = (B 1 , B 2 , · · · , B N ). Moreover, under the assumption that the orthogonal transmission is implemented in each cell, e.g., equal time (and/or frequency) slots are allocated to users one after another in a round-robin manner, for each network s the expected average user rate in one cell can be expressed as [12] 
where N s denotes the average number of users per cell and meanwhile, x s represents the probability that one user would get service k from WSP n or equally, the proportion of users choosing WSP n in the population requiring service k. Hence, x s can be referred to as the population share in the evolutionary game, which will be formally defined in the following subsection.
B. Evolutionary Game Formulation
Our formulated evolutionary game for WSP selection of users can be formally depicted as follows:
• Population: Each set of users requesting one common service is referred to as a population. Hence, there are totally K different populations which can be denoted by set K = {1, 2, · · · , K }.
• Strategy space: For each user in the k-th population, he decides which WSP to get service from. Therefore, the strategy space can be depicted with the set
• Population state: For an evolutionary game, the proportion of users choosing strategy a k ∈ A k , denoted by x a k , is referred to as the population share of strategy a k . Moreover, in each population k, the population share of all strategies is termed as a population state, which can be denoted by vector
Similarly, the population state of the whole K populations can be expressed as
• Payoff function: Payoff is used to quantify the satisfaction level or fitness of a user adopting a strategy when given the population state. Mathematically speaking, the payoff function of an individual user choosing each strategy a k can be regarded as a mapping π a k : x → R. In this work, we depict the payoff function with the following logarithmic function
. Intuitively, for each user, the payoff is determined by both the expected data rate and service expense. We note that, from the economic perspective, the logarithmic payoff function π = ln (1 + y) can capture both the user's non-satiation, i.e., dπ dy > 0, and risk aversion, i.e., dπ 2 dy 2 < 0, properties. Hence, it has been widely adopted in wireless resource allocation to evaluate the satisfaction degree of agents [18] , [19] . It is worth noticing that although only the logarithmic function is considered here, the following analysis also holds when other monotonically increasing functions are adopted. We note that in dynamic evolutionary game theory, the population share of each strategy x a can be interpreted as the current proportion of individuals using the pure strategy a in the population. Meanwhile, the population state x can also be interpreted as a mixed strategy for the corresponding symmetric normal form game, where the population share x a ∈ x represents the probability that each individual player implements pure strategy a [30] . These two interpretations are coincident when the number of users/players is large. Therefore, statistically speaking, the sets of UEs preferring each specified service and subscribing to different WSPs are obtained by independent thinning of the original PPP, which valid the assumptions for the previous stochastic geometry derivation.
C. Replicator Dynamics
To depict the dynamical learning behavior of users, the replicator dynamics is adopted in this paper, which can be expressed as follows:
where δ > 0 is the rate of strategy adaption andπ (x) is the average payoff in the population. Based on the above equation, the percentage growth rate of the population share of each strategy is proportional to the excess of the strategy's payoff over the population's average payoff. It could be interpreted biologically as a model of natural selection, and economically as a model of imitation [30] . As shown in Eq. (11), the dynamics of service selection can be described with K first-order differential equations. Hence, in order to investigate the equilibrium behavior of users, we need to study the fixed point of these differential equations, which is termed as the evolutionary equilibrium (EE) and represented by x * . That is if the population state of the game is at EE, then no user would like to change his strategy. Based on the support, EEs can be mainly divided into two classes, i.e., the boundary EE and interior EE. Particularly, let us consider an EE x * and denote its support as supp ( k∈K we say x * is an interior EE. Otherwise, we call it as a boundary EE. Generally, the class of the achieved EE for the replicator dynamics is determined by the initial state x(0), i.e., supp (x(0)) = supp (x * ). In the concerned problem, we note that for the applied replicator dynamics no boundary EE is stable since any small perturbation will make the system deviate from this boundary state. Hence, in the rest of this paper, we just focus on the interior EE and have the following Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: For the replicator dynamics shown in Eq. (11), the formulated WSP selection game has an unique interior EE state. Let us denote this EE by x * . Then, each element x * a k in x * can be expressed as
. Intuitively, η a k ,k can be regarded as the cost performance index per unit bandwidth of the k-th service provided by WSP a k .
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix I. Remark 1: From the economic perspective, elements in x * can be utilized to evaluate the expected long-term equilibrium of market shares. For instance, the expected market share of each WSP n can be represented as
Therefore, with such statistical results, individual WSPs can gain useful insights about the effect of bandwidth allocation on users' WSP selection and, in return, appropriately deploy their own HCNs.
Besides EE, for an evolutionary game the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is another important solution standing for a refinement of NE with interesting features [42] . Particularly, if the NE is reached, no player is willing to unilaterally change his own strategy under the condition that no other players will deviate from the NE. However, if the ESS is achieved, then no player would like to adopt another strategy even if there is a small group of players irrationally deviate from the ESS. Next, we formally give the definition of ESS [30] .
Definition 1 (ESS):
We termx as an ESS, if for any different population state (or mixed strategy) x =x, there exists some constant ε x ∈ (0, 1) that for all ε ∈ (0, ε x ), we havē
tively denote the expected payoff of the group of users in statē x and x given the current population state (1 − ε)x + εx.
One intuitive interpretation of the above definition is that if the ESS is achieved in a population, a small amount of invaders adopting other strategy instead of ESS would achieve a lower expected payoff than the incumbent does. To see more interpretations, the readers are encouraged to see [30] and [43] . For our formulated evolutionary game and the adopted replicator dynamics, an interior ESS is also an asymptotically stable state, which means that it is stable and attracting ([30, Th. 2.7.1]). Hence, such an asymptotically stable state can be finally reached via evolutionary process with an initial point in some open neighborhood. 5 In general, there is no guarantee that every EE should be aligned with an ESS. In other words, there is no guarantee that the fixed point of a replicator dynamic is also asymptotical stable. However, for the interior EE obtained in Theorem 1, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The unique interior EE x * obtained in Theorem 1 is also an ESS and hence, is asymptotically stable for the adopted replicator dynamics.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix II. Remark 2: It is worth noting that, for our concerned WSP selection game, the reason causing the mutation from the equilibrium state EE could be interpreted from many perspectives. For instance, if we suppose that the formulated game operates in EE x * and at that moment, there are some users joining or leaving the market, then the evolution state may deviate from the EE, i.e., the mutation is introduced. Besides that, the mutation may also be introduced when some users have accidentally made an irrational decision. Fortunately, as shown in the above theorem, the effect of such a mutation would be finally eliminated and the EE would be reached again. These will be further verified with simulation results in Section VI.
IV. BANDWIDTH ALLOCATION GAME
In the previous section, we have analyzed the behavior of the Stackelberg followers (i.e., users) and derived their best response after they acquire the bandwidth allocation strategies announced by the Stackelberg leaders (i.e., WSPs) by implementing an evolutionary game theoretical approach. Now, based on the equilibrium behavior of the followers, we would inspect how individual leaders will make their own informed decisions by utilizing non-cooperative game theory.
To compete for a larger market share and obtain higher revenue, each WSP has to properly allocate the available spectrum. Since the spectrum allocation profile may not be frequently adjusted, WSPs should make their own decisions based on the equilibrium state of the users' behaviors, i.e., the EE. 6 Accordingly, we define the payoff function as the revenue earned by each WSP n, i.e.,
denotes bandwidth allocation profiles of WSPs other than WSP n.
, and ϕ n,k = λ u k η n,k C n,k , ∀k ∈ K n , ∀n ∈ N . Here, we would impose the constraint B n,k ≥ b on each WSP's bandwidth allocation strategy, where b > 0 is a positive constant. 7 As shown in Eq. (13), the payoff of each WSP is determined by both its own bandwidth allocation profile and other WSPs' strategies. We consider that each WSP can acquire the densities of users and some regular network deployment parameters of other HCNs (e.g., the densities and transmit powers of BSs), for instance, through market survey analyses [22] - [25] , [44] . However, each WSP cannot exactly know their competitors' spectrum allocation strategies. Conditioned on this, we formulate the problem as a Non-cooperative Bandwidth Allocation Game (N-BAG) and will interchangeably use the terms WSP and player in this section.
Definition 2: N-BAG: This game can be represented with the tuple
Wherein, N denotes the set of players (identical to the WSP set). For each player n, its strategy space B n is defined as the set of available bandwidth allocation profiles
Based on Eq. (13), when given a strategy profile
the payoff function of each player n, n ∈ N , can be expressed as
where the term χ n,
influence from other players to player n. For a non-cooperative game, NE is a widely utilized solution standing for an equilibrium state, under which no player can unilaterally improve its own payoff by choosing a different strategy [20] . Accordingly, we have the following theorem about the existence of NE for N-BAG.
Theorem 3: For our formulated non-cooperative game N-BAG, there always admits at least one NE under which no WSP would like to unilaterally change his own bandwidth allocation strategy. In addition, when given other WSPs' strategy profile B −n , the best response of WSP n, B * n = B * n,k k∈K n , is unique and can be expressed as
The proof is given in Appendix III. Based on the above analyses, an offline iterative algorithm has been developed to obtain the NE of N-BAG, which is shown in Algorithm 1. Particularly, at the beginning of this algorithm, a starting point will be initialized based on the available bandwidth of each WSP, i.e., k∈K n B n,k = B n , ∀n ∈ N . After that, the algorithm goes into a loop. At every iteration t, the optimal Lagrange multiplier υ * n can be calculated with Eq. (19) and then, the best response B n (t) can be updated by applying Eq. (18) . This loop will terminate when the relative difference of the solutions obtained after two Calculate the optimal Lagrange multiplier υ * n with Eq. (19) and then, update the best response B n (t) by applying Eq. (18). 6 : end for 7: until the stop criterion shown in Eq. (20) is satisfied. 8: For B n,k (t) being equal to b, set both its value (i.e., B n,k (t)) and the corresponding payoff U n,k (t) to 0, ∀k ∈ K n , ∀n ∈ N . 9: Set B * n = B n (t) and
consecutive iterations (i.e., (B n (t − 1)) n∈N and (B n (t)) n∈N ) is small enough. Mathematically speaking, the stopping criterion of Algorithm 1 can be expressed as
where · denotes a proper vector norm and ε is a small positive constant. Finally, effects of the added constraint B n,k ≥ b would be eliminated with the operation in line 8 of this algorithm. Remark 3: It should be noted that given an initial point (B n (0)) n∈N , Algorithm 1 will converge to the unique solution NE B * n n∈N . While the initial point changes, the finally achieved solution may be different unless the NE of N-BAG is unique.
From a mathematical perspective, the corresponding algorithm proposed for handling N-BAG is somewhat similar to the well-known Iterative Water-Filling Algorithm (IWFA) for power control [45] . However, a significant difference that makes it is more complicated to prove the uniqueness of the NE is that, the "water levels" for services in our work are different unlike the case with uniform one over channels in [45] . Therefore, the sufficient condition for the uniqueness of NE in [45] cannot be directly utilized here. For our formulated N-BAG, we would utilize the contraction mapping argument [46] to derive the sufficient condition, under which the uniqueness of NE can be guaranteed. Before giving the related theorem, we first present the following lemma.
Lemma 2 [46] : If the best response mapping is a contraction on the whole strategy space, there is a unique NE in the game. Wherein, the mapping f (x) is a contraction iff
Here, · denotes a proper norm. Then, we have the following theorem about the uniqueness condition of NE in N-BAG.
Theorem 4: When all the WSPs would provide K services, i.e.,
can be satisfied, then there exists one and only one NE in N-BAG. Wherein,
n , and sup χ n denotes the supremum on all feasible χ n . Accordingly, the Jacobian matrix of F n at χ n is
and additionally, the Jacobian matrix of χ n at B −n is given in Eq. (23), as shown at the top of this page, where [·] T represents the transpose of a matrix. Proof: The proof is given in Appendix IV. For completeness, we would select the maximum-absolutevalue norm [48] as an example and simplify the sufficient condition presented in Theorem 4. As shown in Eq. (23), we have
where · mav denotes the maximum-absolute-value norm.
In addition, η n,k = λ n,kR
represents the cost performance index per unit bandwidth of the k-th service provided by WSP n. Recalling the best response of WSP n in Eq. (18) and (19), let's denote
n,k and then, ∀n, m ∈ N and ∀l, l ∈ K , we have
Hence, we further have
Recalling 
Meanwhile, according to Eq. (19), we have 8
Then, combing Eq. (27) and (28) we further have
Therefore, the maximum-absolute-value norm of ∂F n ∂χ n can be expressed as
Then, we have the following inequation:
Based on the above analysis, the uniqueness condition shown in Eq. (21) can be equivalently transformed as 
According to the relationship specified in Eq. (32), we can check whether the uniqueness (sufficient) condition can be satisfied or not for a specific scenario with given network parameters, e.g., the densities and transmit powers of deployed BSs. We note that our developed Algorithm 1 is an offline algorithm, which can be independently implemented by each WSP in practice and will convergence to an NE when given one common initial point, e.g., equally allocating the available bandwidth to each tier during initialization. Additionally, in some countries, this algorithm can also be implemented by some neutral institution [47] and the derived strategy would be informed to each WSP independently, i.e., a centralized bandwidth allocation scheme. 9 Due to the fact that each WSP knows that it is impossible to unilaterally improve the revenue by choosing a strategy different from that suggested by the neutral institution, the recommended strategies will be adopted by rational WSPs, eventually.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
To evaluate the effectiveness of our theoretical analysis, simulations are conducted and the corresponding results are presented in this section. We consider the region where totally K = 3 different services would be provided to users by HCNs, i.e., the macrocell service, picocell service and femtocell service, which are labeled by 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Accordingly, the three populations of users are respectively denoted by P1, P2, and P3. Unless specified otherwise, the simulation parameters are adopted as listed in Table I .
A. EE and ESS for Users' WSP Selection
In this subsection, we illustrate the dynamics of users' behaviors. There exist three different WSPs each of which 9 Actually, in China, a new company, China Tower, has been created on July 11, 2014, which will take the response to bring the concerted and joint development to the three WSPs, i.e., China Mobile, China Telecom and China Unicom [48] .
offers all the three services to users. We label these WSPs as WSP 1, WSP 2 and WSP 3 and meanwhile, set the densities of BSs deployed by them as 40, 30) and λ 3,1 , λ 3,2 , λ 3,3 = (1, 10, 60). 10 Intuitively, this setting means that the three WSPs respectively have their own appealing service. To see the dynamics of users, we conduct the simulation in a region with 1000 km 2 which on average, consists of 20000, 60000, and 100000 users in P1, P2 and P3, respectively. Here, we consider that each WSP would equally allocate the available bandwidth to each tier. During the initialization of this simulation, users in each population would randomly select one available WSP. After that, they will adopt the pairwise proportional imitation during the evolutionary progress [43] .
The dynamics of population state and payoff achieved by each user are shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 , respectively. From these two figures, we can see that the EE of formulated evolutionary game can be achieved less than 30 iterations. Meanwhile, as shown in Theorem 1, when this equilibrium state is achieved in each population, all the users will obtain the same payoff no matter getting the service from which WSP. In other words, from the perspective of payoff achieved by users, the load among WSPs is balanced when EE is reached. Intuitively, this result means that no user in the stable market can obtain a higher payoff by changing the decision, e.g., choosing another WSP providing better service and charging less. In order to further see the asymptotical stability of the EE, we suppose that at the moment that the evolutionary time is 40, 20% of the users selecting WSP 1 and WSP 2 would churn to WSP 3 in each population, for example, due to the inaccuracy of obtaining information, i.e., a mutation occurs. To realize this in our simulation, at the moment, we have randomly chosen 20% users from those selecting WSP 1 and WSP 2 in each populations and made them to get services from WSP 3.
At first, it can be observed that the payoff achieved by the user selecting WSP 3 is reduced due to the fact that this mutation demolishes the load balance among WSPs. Fig. 3 . The dynamics of the population share in the population P1, P2 and P3. To illustrate the asymptotic stability of the EE, a mutation is introduced in each population when the evolutionary time is 40. Fig. 4 . The dynamics of the payoff obtained by each user in the population P1, P2 and P3. To illustrate the asymptotic stability of the EE, a mutation is introduced in each population when the evolutionary time is 40. However, since the EE is asymptotically stable, the equilibrium state EE would be reached again. For this reason, from a long term perspective, it seems plausible for each WSP to evaluate the market share and deploy his own HCN based on this stable state of users.
B. Convergence of Algorithm 1
In this subsection the convergence of our proposed algorithm, i.e., Algorithm 1, is evaluated through simulation. Here, the required relative accuracy ε (in Eq. (20)) and the added bandwidth allocation constraint b (in Eq. (43)) are set to 10 −3 and 10 −5 MHz, respectively. Moreover, the densities of BSs are the same as those in Section VI-A. To show the uniqueness of NE for the formulated game N-BAG, we run the simulation with 10000 independent realizations of the initial point in Algorithm 1 and for clear exposition, present 200 results in Fig. 5. 11 Wherein, the bandwidth allocation profile at iteration 0 denotes the starting point of the algorithm. As illustrated in this figure, the equilibrium state of N-BAG can be reached after a few iterations, i.e., about 5 iterations. Moreover, we can see that the same strategy would be finally adopted by each individual WSP independent of the initial conditions. In other words, the NE of the game is unique. Besides that, we notice that for WSP 1, 2 and 3, in order to achieve a higher payoff, they have utilized the most bandwidth to provide the macrocell service, picocell service and femtocell service, respectively. One main reason lies in the fact that, compared with other two WSPs, each WSP has deployed the most dense The bandwidth allocated to macrocell service vs. the densities of MBSs and PBSs. It can be seen that the effects of BSs densities on bandwidth allocation strategy are significant even for the case only consisting of two WSPs.
BSs for one particular service, e.g., λ 1,1 > λ 2,1 > λ 3,1 and λ 2,2 > λ 1,2 > λ 3,2 .
C. Performance Evaluation
First, we want to explore the effects of BSs' densities on the bandwidth allocation for the WSP. For ease of exposition, we consider two WSPs (WSP 1 and WSP 2) each of which would provide two services (macrocell service and picocell service) to two populations of users (P1 and P2). Here, we suppose that both the densities of users in the two populations and those of BSs deployed by WSP 1 are fixed, which are set as λ (20, 60) and λ 1,1 , λ 1,2 = (2, 20) , respectively, while the densities of MBSs and PBSs deployed by WSP 2 (i.e., λ 2,1 and λ 2,2 ) vary. According to the changes of λ 2,1 and λ 2,2 , the bandwidth allocated to the macrocell service by WSP 2, B 2,1 , and his achieved payoff, U 2 , are illustrated in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 , respectively. Wherein, λ 2,1 varies from 1 to 5 and λ 2,2 varies from 5 to 60. Since B 2,1 + B 2,1 = B 2 which is a constant, the results about B 2,2 are omitted here for the sake of brevity.
From Fig. 6 it is seen that the densities of MBSs and PBSs have a significant effect on WSP 2's bandwidth allocation strategy even for the case only consisting of two WSPs. More specifically, two observations can be made. On one hand, when given the density of PBS, λ 2,2 , the bandwidth allocated to macrocell service, B 2,1 , first increases with respect to the density of MBS λ 2,1 and then decreases. Additionally, the threshold is around λ 2,1 = 2 which equals to the density of MBSs deployed by WSP 1. The reason is that when λ 2,1 is small, in order to attract more users in population P1 and earn higher revenue, WSP 2 has to allocate more bandwidth to macrocell service to improve his competitiveness. However, after λ 2,1 > λ 1,1 the macrocell service offered by WSP 2 can provide users higher expected achievable rate per unit bandwidth, i.e., R 0 2,1 > R 0 1,1 . As shown in Theorem 1, this indicates that WSP 2 may attract more users in P1 than WSP 1 dose, even if WSP 2 allocates less bandwidth for this service. Hence, he can reserve more bandwidth for the second service to further improve the payoff. On the other hand, it is shown that given λ 2,1 , B 2,1 would first decrease and then increase when λ 2,2 gradually becomes larger. The reason for this trend is similar to the one previously stated. Besides that, it is not surprising that the divide in this case appears near to the point that λ 2,2 = 20, which is equal to λ 1,2 . More importantly, we should note that these results are different to those illustrated in [18] , where it is shown that the spectrum allocated to some service s is non-decreasing with respect to the density of the corresponding BSs λ s . This difference is mainly driven by the competition among WSPs.
To see the trend of the obtained payoff U 2 , we can refer to Fig. 7 . It should be noted that, in contrast to B 2,1 , the payoff U 2 is monotonically increasing with respect to both λ 2,1 and λ 2,2 . The reasons can be explained as follows. When deploying more BSs, the WSP will have a higher competitiveness in the market and hence, can attract more users to further improve his own payoff. Additionally, another important reason for the monotonically increasing of U 2 is due to the fact that the cost for BSs deployment is not taken into account here. Otherwise, the trend of U 2 would probably first increase and Finally, we want to compare our method with other three bandwidth allocation schemes presented as follows.
• Uniform distribution (UD): With this approach each WSP equally divide the available bandwidth into subbands and allocated them to different tiers.
• Proportion to density of BSs (PDBS): With this approach each WSP allocate the available bandwidth to each tier based on the density of BSs, i.e.,
• Proportion to density of users (PDU): With this approach each WSP allocate the available bandwidth to each tier based on the density of potential users in each population, i.e.,
We note that this scheme is similar to the one proposed in [18] , which focuses on the monopoly scenario, i.e., one single WSP. Here, we consider there are three WSPs, each of which deploys a 3-tier HCN with the BS density of λ 1,k = 2λ 2,k = 4λ 3,k , where λ 3,1 , λ 3,2 , λ 3,3 = (0. 5, 5, 10) . In addition, the available bandwidth of the three WSPs are set as: (B 1 , B 2 , B 3 ) = (20, 10, 5) MHz, which means that the bandwidth obtained by each WSP is not the same and may sometimes happen in practice. Based on the different HCN deployments, we consider that the prices charged by WSPs are also different: We evaluate the performance of these schemes in terms of the sum payoff U = n∈N U n , which are illustrated in Fig. 8 .
While λ u 3 varies from 60 to 150 during the simulation, both the density of users in P1 and that in P2 are set constant according to Table I , i.e., λ u 1 = 20 and λ u 2 = 60. From Fig. 8 we can see that, compared with other three schemes, our proposed algorithm can bring the highest sum payoff to WSPs. For instance, when λ u 3 = 150 our algorithm yields a performance advantage about 11.8% relative to the scheme PDBS, i.e., from 66.01 to 73.77. The main reason for this improvement lies in the fact that, by formulating the bandwidth allocation problem as a game, rational WSPs could intelligently allocate the available bandwidth well considering the competition among them. In addition, it is interestingly observed that the sum payoff achieved by the scheme UD and that by PDU are the same. To explain this, it should be noted that when implementing these two strategies, the ratio of provided bandwidth from different WSPs is the same for a given service, i.e., B 1,k : B 2,k : B 3,k = 4 : 2 : 1, ∀k ∈ K . Recalling Eq. (13), this further means that each particular WSP n will obtain the same payoff when adopting UD and PDU.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, the users' wireless service provider (WSP) selection as well as WSPs' bandwidth allocation in multi-tier heterogeneous cellular networks (HCNs) has been investigated by adopting the approach combining stochastic geometry and game theory. After analyzing the expected average rate, the evolutionary equilibrium (EE) of users' behaviors, and the existence as well as uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (NE) for the Non-cooperative Bandwidth Allocation Game among WSPs, we have developed an algorithm to achieve the NE. Simulation results have shown the effects of the BSs' as well as users' densities on WSP's bandwidth allocation decision. In addition, it has also been demonstrated by simulation that, compared with other schemes, a higher sum revenue could be achieved by the self-interested and rational WSPs by implementing our proposed algorithm.
There are many interesting extensions for this work. One of the possible extensions is to consider the populations of users classified according to their QoS requirements instead of the desired services. In this case, the analytical framework proposed in this paper also does work, but the specific problem formulation and solutions will change. Another one extension is shifting our focus from HCNs with the dedicated channel deployment to those with the co-channel deployment, where all tiers in each HCN share the same frequency bands. Then, given the investment budget and cost of developing different BSs, an interesting problem faced by each WSP is deciding how many BSs in each tier should be deployed to maximize the revenue.
APPENDIX I PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof:
Substituting Eq. (10) into Eq. (11), we can equally transform the replicator dynamics of the formulated evolutionary service selection game as Eq. (35), as shown at the top of next page. Based on Eq. (35) , in order to get the EE x * , we should make sure thatẋ *
and
Further, we can get the expression of the EE as
where ∀a k ∈ A k , ∀k ∈ K . Then, replacing the term
by η a k ,k we can draw the conclusion shown in Theorem 1.
APPENDIX II PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: Based on the folk theorem of an evolutionary game, any strict NE corresponds to an ESS [30] . Meanwhile, it is obvious that the solution in Eq. (12) is an equilibrium for the evolution dynamics in Eq. (11), since there is no player would change his own strategy, i.e.,ẋ s = 0 for any s ∈ S. Hence, we will prove this theorem by showing the equilibrium x * is a strict NE. Considering the evolution game operates in EE x * , the payoff obtained by a user selecting service s is π s (x * ) = ln 1 + (10)). In addition, we have π s (x * ) = π l (x * ), ∀s, l ∈ S. Now, suppose that some user (or users) deviates (or deviate) the strategy from s to l where s = l, and then the population state becomes
where the constant ξ > 0 is determined by the number of users deviating the strategy. Moreover, with the deviation from strategy s to l, the payoff of the user becomes
It follows that π s (x * ) > π l ( x) and further means that the deviating from the equilibrium state will lower the payoff of the user, which satisfies the definition of the strict NE [26] , [35] . Now, the proof is completed.
APPENDIX III PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof: First, we will prove the existence of NE for the formulated game N-BAG. After some algebraic computations we can transform the payoff of each WSP n as
It is easy to prove that the n-th player's payoff U n is concave over his strategy set B n for each fixed B −n and meanwhile, the strategy space (B n ) n∈N is a closed and bounded convex set [49] . Therefore, we can know that G is a concave game which always admits at least one NE [50] . We note that this proposition can be proved through three steps. First, when given a strategy profile, it can be proved that the best response of each player is compact and convex, which is due to the continuity and concavity of the payoff function. Then, it can be established that the best response function : (B n ) n∈N → (B n ) n∈N is upper semicontinuous. Finally, by applying Kakutani fixed point theorem, it can be proved that there exists a fixed point ((B * n ) n∈N ) = (B * n ) n∈N . To be more specific, this fixed point (B * n ) n∈N is a NE for the concerned concave game.
Next, we will derive the expression of the best response of WSP n when given the strategy profile of other WSPs B −n . In this case, for each player n, selecting the strategy maximizing his own payoff is equivalent to solving the following optimal spectrum allocation problem
which is a convex programming problem. For problem P, the Lagrangian function can be written as
where θ n,k ≥ 0 and υ n are the Lagrange multipliers [49] . Moreover, the KKT conditions can be expressed as
Since problem P is a convex problem, the optimal variable B * n = B * n,k k∈K n can be achieved by solving the KKT conditions (46) , which could be further transformed as
To solve the above equations, two disjoint cases need to be considered. Firstly, if
, the first three conditions in Eq. (47) only hold when 
Meanwhile, recalling the constraint that k∈K n B n,k = B n , we can get the optimal Lagrange multiplier υ * n by solving
Finally, we will prove the uniqueness of B * n when given B −n . It should be noted that the left side of the above equation is a piece-wise-linear increasing function of 1 υ * n , hence the solution of this equation is unique when given B −n , which further means that the solution shown in Eq. (18) is also unique in the same case, i.e., given B −n . Now, we complete the proof.
APPENDIX IV PROOF OF THEOREM 4
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